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THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
IN THE AUSTRALIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY 
ABSTRACT 
This study assesses the economic impact of existing Australian dairy pricing 
policies on resource allocation and income distribution among participants in 
dairy markets. Australia is used as an example because it recently became 
the first major producing country to decide to eliminate federal intervention 
in the dairy price discovery process. Results indicate that significant costs 
and transfers can be attributed to the influence of government intervention. 
Also, evidence of policy bias favoring producers over consumers is found. 
Keywords: dairy products, government intervention, pricing policies, 
regulated monopoly, economic impact, Australia 
THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
IN THE AUSTRALIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY 
The dairy industries of all major producing countries are subject to govern-
ment intervention (Schelhaas). The existence of intervention in the pricing 
process implies that a governments' second-best approach is .better than a 
competitive market. Such a conclusion is being challenged increasingly world-
wide because of the dairy product surpluses which exist (Dairy Industries In-
ternational). Dairy policies are criticized for being designed to favor 
producers at the expense of consumers. It is argued that where such policy 
bias exists, inefficiencies are introduced into production and marketing systems, 
which adversely affects the performance of the policy itself (Samuels, et al.). 
,,---
~ 
As a result, there is a need to evaluate the performance of dairy policies 
"---
against standards of economic efficiency. Therefo~ the objective of this 
study is to assess the economic effect of existing Australian dairy pricing 
policies by quantifying the costs and benefits resulting from their use, and 
the impact of government intervention on resource allocation and income distri-
bution among participants in Australian dairy markets. Australia is used as an 
example because that government recently evaluated its dairy policies and 
decided to gradually eliminate federal intervention in the price discovery 
process - becoming the first major producer to do so. 
This paper is organized into three sections. First, a brief description 
of Australian dairy policy organizations and instruments is presented. Next, 
the economic effects of pricing policies are estimated. Finally, policy effects 
are assessed concerning their relative impact on producers and consumers. 
Policy Organizations and Instruments 
The following sections outline the organizational arrangements and consider 
to what extent use of existing policy instruments can be explained by an 
economic model. 
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The Organizations 
The Australian Dairy Corporation (ADC) is presently involved in administering 
legislation dealing with the marketing arrangements for prescribed dairy products 
(butter, certain cheeses, wholemilk powder, skim milk powder/buttermilk powder, 
and casein). Under existing marketing arrangements, a "stabilization levy" is 
set separately for each prescribed product at the difference between the assessed 
export price (AEP) and the desired domestic bulk wholesale price. 1 The ADC makes 
recommendations to the Minister for Primary Industry on the level of both 
stabilization levies and assessed export prices. Upon the sale of products for 
domestic consumption, manufacturers pay levies into separate product accounts 
of the Dairy Products Stabilization Trust Fund (which is administered by the ADC). 
The ADC makes interim stabilization payments to manufacturers from the Stabili-
zation Fund. All exports of prescribed dairy products are pooled at the minimum 
export (permit) price fixed by the ADC. 
State dairy industry authorities are the second source of government inter-
vention in the pricing process. In each state and the Australian Capital 
Territory, a statutory dairy industry authority (DIA) or similar body is 
responsible for the organization of the purchase, production, supply, manu-
facture, treatment, storage, transport, packing, sale and distribution of milk 
and dairy produce so as to ensure the continuous availability of all classes 
of milk. Specifically, DIAs set market (fluid) milk prices to farmers and 
the margins payable at all stages of the marketing system. 
All DIAs have first claim to milk to ensure adequate market milk supplies. 
Most DIAs use a market milk contracting system to guarantee supplies. Con-
tracts for the delivery of milk to factories are surrendered by dairy farmers. 
Factories compensate dairy farmers for milk delivered under contract. Farmers 
receive the current market milk price for the proportion of their output sur-
rendered under contract, and they receive the lower manufacturing milk price 
for additional output. 
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An important feature of the milk supply system is that no market milk is 
traded across state borders. Although the federal government has the authority 
to intervene in the market milk sector it has chosen to allow each state to 
administer their own supply system. This action has, in effect, created a 
regulated monopoly for market milk in each state. 
The Instruments 
This section describes the major instruments of dairy policy using a 
profit-maximizing model. To begin with, it is assumed that milk and dairy pro-
duct producers, similar to other economic agents in society, would like to 
maximize their profits. By collectively restricting domestic sales, the in-
dustry would be able to keep prices at a level above that which would occur 
under freely competitive conditions. However, each producer individually would 
still like to increase his sales at the higher price that would result. There-
fore, a monopolizing agent is needed to enforce the desired individual behavior 
for the collective good. For the purposes of this study, the model assumes 
that the ADC and DIAs act as agents for the producers as a group to enforce the 
collective action on each individual producer. This leads to a consideration 
of the behavior of a constrained or regulated monopolist (on the domestic 
market). 
The processing sector is assumed to be competitive. The evidence avail-
able on concentration, exit, entry, pricing, trade practices, state regulations 
and retailers' demand suggests that, generally, the processing sector behaves 
competitively (Blank and Campbell, IAC 1976, IDF). Therefore, processing costs 
can be considered as independent of the output decisions of dairy producers, 
and it is assumed here that they are constant over the relevant range of output. 
Considered first is the most significant aspect of Commonwealth arrange-
ments for the manufacturing sector: the process of equalization. This involves 
pooling - separately for each product (or product group) - the returns from 
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domestic and export. sales of dairy products, and means that manufacturers 
receive an average, or equalized, price for all their production of a particular 
dairy product. 
Legislation implementing the scheme, essentially aimed at protecting the 
domestic price structure, became effective on 1 July 1977. The legislation 
provides for maintenance of a differential between the domestic and export 
prices of prescribed products. The price differential is maintained by imposing 
compulsory levies on domestic sales of these products with each levy equivalent 
to the difference between the domestic bulk wholesale price and the assessed 
export price (AEP) of the product. 
The levy is payable by the manufacturer of prescribed products which are 
sold for domestic consumption or used in own manufacture, but stabilization 
payments are made uniformly across all production of each product irrespective 
of whether it is sold on the domestic or export market. All stabilization pay-
ments must be passed on in an equitable manner to all suppliers of the milk 
from which the product was made. 
The levies are set three times each year by the Minister for Primary In-
dustry. Before making a decision, the Minister considers recommendations on 
levy amounts made by the ADC and the Australian Dairy Industry Advisory Com-
mittee. Domestic levy amounts are derived after the desired domestic bulk 
wholesale price level has been identified. In fact, domestic levies are 
determined by subtracting the AEP from the preferred domestic price (BWDP-AEP DL). 
Therefore, the ADC's recommendations for domestic levies are based on thei r ex-
pectations of what the appropriate prices will be on domestic wholesale markets. 
Price discrimination operates through the equalization system. Prescribed 
products which cannot be sold domestically at the supported price are disposed 
of on foreign markets "at a loss," in the sense that the opportunity to receive 
the higher domestic price is lost. The different prices serve to maximize the 
revenues on total sales and increase the profits of the industry as a whole 
above the level which it would earn without price discrimination. 
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The extra revenues earned through price discrimination constitute a transfer 
from the domestic consumer to the producer. Insofar as the higher price reduces 
consumption domestically, there is also a net welfare loss. 
The fact that equalization enables domestic prices to be maintained above 
export prices has provoked widespread debate over the true value of such a 
program. Turnovsky showed that publicly announced forecasts (such as those 
made for domestic wholesale prices) can have a price-stabilizing impact. Yet 
Veeman showed that potential long-term transfer and social costs are substantial 
when prices are supported above equilibrium levels. Godden, in attempting to 
measure the resource misallocation costs associated with the Australian dairy 
equalization scheme, found that those costs were large and that they increase 
significantly as export prices fall. 
The second policy instrument, the Underwriting Scheme, began with an agree-
ment in 1975 between Commonwealth and state governments to underwrite the 
equalized value of SMP. In subsequent years the scheme was extended to include 
all prescribed products. 
Government contributions to a stablization fund are needed when the 
equalized price of a product is below its underwritten price. Underwriting 
places a lower limit on the equalization value of a product as a means of pro-
viding assistance to the dairy industry. Underwriting levels are now deter-
mined by a formula which is 95 per cent of the average of estimated pool re-
turns for three years (a forecast for the year in question and actual values 
of the two previous years). The assessment of the current scheme is that it 
has a potholing effect, in that it protects the dairy industry against unex-
pected and sharp price declines without masking long-term market trends (IAC 
1983). 
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Export policies influence the dairy industry also. In Australia, as in 
nearly all other exporting nations, dairy exports constitute a residual market 
because export volumes represent a small proportion (18 per cent) of total 
production (BAE 1983a). Australia has an unwritten goal of remaining self-
sufficient in all major dairy products. Therefore, production is encouraged 
to remain at that level plus a buffer stock to guard against shortfalls created 
by shocks to the productive system (ADC). This means that any production 
above that self-sufficiency-plus-buffer level will be available for export. 
A profit-maximizing industry exports only if revenue cover the costs of 
the exports. However, once output is subsidized, a wedge is created between 
marginal revenue received by the producer (which includes equalization pay-
ments) and the marginal revenue originating from the buyer. The subsidized 
industry will export its output until marginal costs exceed the marginal re-
venue from the foreign purchaser. Thus, the value of a price equalization 
scheme is reduced by extra costs of production as output expands until marginal 
cost is equal to marginal revenue from abroad plus the equalization payment. 
For market milk the most significant Australian policy instrument is 
the market milk quota system (or its equivalent) operating in each state. 
Their purpose is to restrict market milk supplies so that a price premium can 
be maintained. The New South Wales market milk quota (MMQ) system is typical: 
the DIA grants a minimum quota per week to newly registered dairies after they 
have produced for 12 months. For a farm to share in the growth of market milk 
sales, at least 110 per cent of current quota volume must be produced in each 
of 13 four-week periods. To gain add~tional quota from the pool of surrendered 
quota, a dairy farmer must have produced 120 per cent of quota for 12-months. 
For production of 100-110 per cent of quota, no change will be made in a 
farmer's quota, while production of less than 100 per cent of quota over a 
12-month period will lead to a reduction in the size of quota allocated for 
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the next year. The net effect of this price discriminatory quota system is 
that surplus production is encouraged (Samuels et al.). 
In summary, it is clear that Australian pricing arrangements act to signi-
ficantly reduce the level of competition between domestic suppliers of dairy 
products. The effects of this reduced level of competition are to raise the 
domestic (equilibrium) market price and to create the capacity to effect a 
transfer from consumers to producers. An artificial market price has been 
created, therefore, as a consequence of the specific instruments chosen. 
Quantitative Analysis 
This section presents estimates of the economic effects of current Australian 
dairy policy. Prices paid by consumers are compared with marginal costs of 
production and with the competitive outcome. 
Marginal Costs 
In states which have relatively large market milk quotas, producers are 
allowed to expand beyond the point at which price equals "nonnal" marginal costs. 
In these states, producers get a "super-nonnal" return above the return that 
the market would generate without price and supply management in the dairy 
sector. Insofar as this "super-normal" return includes price benefits of the 
dairy program, there is some waste of resources. 
In states where market milk quotas are relatively small, production is 
kept nearer the point at which marginal cost equals price and "normal" 
competitive returns are earned. The equalized price of manufacturing milk is 
the same there as in the states with no scarcity of market milk quota, but 
output is held to a level where costs are lower. 
States in which less than the Australian national average of 29 per cent 
of total milk production is sold as market milk2 are assumed to be constrained 
by market milk quota: Victoria and Tasmania are identified as having marginal 
costs constrained near the competitive level (even though most producers do 
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receive some additional profit from market milk sales). It is noteworthy that 
these two States contributed 65.1 per cent of total Australian milk production 
during 1981-82, with 59.4 per cent coming from Victoria alone. 
States which consume more than the national average of their total milk 
production as market milk are assumed to have enough market milk quota (or its 
equivalent) so that a majority of producers benefit significantly from "super-
normal" returns. Therefore, producers in South Australia, Queensland, Western 
Australia and New South Wales are not significantly constrained by the competi-
tive level of marginal costs, on average. 
Clearly, it is to a milk producer's benefit to gain market milk quota. As 
an indication of how valuable farmers perceive MMQ to be, in Queensland - the 
only state in which quota can be sold - the negotiable value of surrendered 
weekly MMQ was $50/1 during 1980-81. For a producer currently operating at 
the margin, this price represents an investment requiring a payback period of 
. 1 . 3 approximate y six years. 
The average price differential between market milk and manufacturing milk 
has been significant in recent years. As shown below, the differential has 
been 75-80 per cent of the value of manufacturing milk, on average, across 
Australia. 4 
1981-82 1982-83 
Market milk 28.1 30.9 
Manufacturing milk 15.6 17.6 
Differential 12.5¢/L 13.3¢/L 
Skim Milk Powder 
One of the features of the dairy program is price discrimination in the 
market for SMP (and other prescribed products). Due to equalization, the 
domestic price of powder is maintained above the price at which the so-called 
"surplus" is sold on world markets. 
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A competitive market could not sustain a differential between domestic 
and export prices (apart from transportation costs) even where such a market 
was protected from imports. Competition among producers would bid the domestic 
price down to the world price or to the price at which all powder produced 
could be sold domestically, whichever is higher. 
It is shown in this section that all powder produced could not be con-
sumed domestically at a price above the world price; and since no producer need 
accept less than he could get on the world market, the domestic price would 
not fall below the world price. Thus, the competitive price for SMP which is 
compared with the current regime is the world price. (Average Australian F.O.B. 
export prices are used as a proxy for world prices.) Consumption and prices 
for calendar years 1980-81 and 1981-82 are used (taken from BAE 1983a). 
Prices have been converted to 1981-82 dollars using the consumer price index. 
Average volumes and prices (in real terms) have been used to reduce the effect ~ ~\.J. 
~~1 
of year to year fluctuations partly due to statistical reporting methods. Jl~~ ~ 1 
The elasticity of domestic demand for taken from tf'Y~~ 
"---" 
Song and Hallberg. Although this elasticity comes from American studies, it ~J 
is expected that an Australian figure (none exist at present) would be similar., ~ 
This expectation arises from the fact that results of Australian studies of 
fluid milk (Street, Nelson) have been very similar to results of American 
(George and King) and Canadian (Lu and Marshall) studies. Strictly, this 
elasticity is applied to farm prices but has been used with respect to whole-
sale prices. This may produce a slight underestimate of the consumer response 
to changes in prices that are calculated here. However, Nelson notes that 
if there is a constant percentage mark-up between the two, wholesale and 
farm price elasticities will be the same. As noted previously, the milk pro-
cessing sector is treated as competitive so that changes in wholesale prices 
result in the same absolute changes in price received by the producer. 5 
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If the quantity consumed domestically at the domestic price is signifi-
cantly less than total current output, then competition among producers 
would drive the domestic price down to the world price. Since elasticity of 
demand (n) is -0.28, the increase in quantity consumed domestically (6Q) which 
would result from lowering the domestic price to the world price is: 
6Q nQ 6P/P 
0.28 x 33K (1,035 - 900)/1,035 
1.2 kt 
This would have increased domestic consumption to about 34 kt for 1981-82, 
far short of total output (78 kt). Therefore, the world price would have pre-
vailed under competition. Using data for 1980-81 to 1981-82, the average 
annual transfer from consumers to producers has been: 
(p p ) Q = (1,012 sd - SC d 945) 39.3K 
$2.6m 
where Psd is the domestic price, Psc is the competitive price and Qd is domestic 
consumption. The net welfare loss is approximately equal to: 
(0.5) (.28) (1,012 - 945) 2 39.3K/l,012 
$24,406 
In other words, SMP price discrimination has imposed an average annual cost 
of approximately $2.7m on Australian consumers of which $2.6m accrues to the 
dairy industry and about $24,000 is net social loss. This is $2.6m more revenue 
than a competitive market (even one protected from imports) would generate and " 
is, therefore, part of the receipts attributable to government intervention. 
The Competitive Outcome 
So far, price differentials have been measured relative to marginal costs 
at protected levels of output. In this section the change in costs associated 
with an expansion to the competitive outcome is considered. The purposes are, 
first, to establish the price that consumers would pay and, second, to compare 
,, 
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the costs they currently expect to face with the revenues producers expect to 
receive under price management in excess of the competitive outcome. 
It is assumed that Victoria's and Tasmania's marginal cost of production 
at current levels of output would be nearly the same following a rationalization 
of the industry due to competition. That is, there is little adjustment for 
~ 6 the effects of relocation due to removal of market milk contract constraints. 
The elasticity of the marginal cost of production schedule with respect to 
changes in costs (i.e. the elasticity of the competitive supply schedule) is 
assumed to be 1.0, taken from a range of likely estimates considered by Godden 
and the IAC (1975). Blank found that the elasticity of the aggregate derived 
demand schedule for Australian manufacturing milk7 is approximately -.82. The 
change in amount demanded, 6Q, due to a fall in price, 6P, is equated to the 
change in supply, 6Q, accompanied by a rise in costs, 6C, which would result 
from a move to the competitive price and quantity. The change in demand (6Q) 
is approximately: 
6Q = nQd 6P/Pw 
where n is the elasticity of aggregate demand (-.28) for domestic milk products 
with respect to the wholesale price Pw (for which the average 1981-82 price of 
milk in Cheddar is used - 25.9¢/L). 
The change in supply 6Q is approximately: 
where n' is the elasticity of the cost schedule (1.0) and c1 is marginal cost 
at output Qd and has been estimated above, for Victoria and Tasmania, as 
15.6¢/L. 
Given that the current differential8 between the competitive price and 
c1 is estimated at ~p + ~C = 3.7¢/L, it is possible to solve these three 
equations for ~c. ~P and ~Q. The results are 
~C 1.4¢/L 
~p 2.3¢/L 
~Q 379 ML 
An adjustment to the competitive outcome would cause marginal costs to 
rise by 1.4¢/L from their current level as output increased by 379 ML (7.3 
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per cent), and would cause competitive consumer prices to drop to 2.3¢/L below 
current levels.9 
Cheese 
The costs and benefits associated with pricing cheese above marginal costs 
are calculated in this section. The data for these calculations are taken from 
BAE (1983a). Annual average volumes have again been used for the years 1980-81 
and 1981-82. It is assumed that price management raises the prices of domestic 
and imported cheese by the same absolute amount. 
All cheese is considered as a single homogeneous product equivalent to 
cheddar. Cheddar and variety cheeses are aggregated by weight. The price 
used for all cheese is the domestic bulk wholesale price of cheddar as at July 
1982 which is more than the competitive world price by approximately the amount 
of the domestic levy ($600/t of cheese in 1981-82). This single price assump-
tion may bias calculation of the transfer from consumers to importers. 1° For 
domestic cheeses, the single price assumption is not likely to have a serious 
effect on estimates of costs and benefits associated with the dairy program, 
as these are based mainly on changes in prices rather than absolute prices. 11 
A Bureau of Agricultural Economics study of Australian demand for cheese 
in 1978 gave a value of -0.5 for the price elasticity of cheese. More recent 
estimates by the International Dairy Federation give an elasticity in the range 
-0.12 to -0.7 for EEC members. In this case, -0.5 is used because it is 
considered to be most representative of the Australian market. 
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In this paper, the effect of higher prices for imports is measured as a 
"transfer from consumers to importing agents." This is certainly a cost to 
consumers, but it is not clear who benefits and whether they benefit by the 
whole amount. The economic rents associated with the right to import cheese 
into Australia may accrue to a diverse group of economic agents. Thus, 
"importers" is hereafter used generically to refer to all of these agents, 
and there is no attempt to distribute the benefits among them. 
The transfer from consumers to domestic producers amounted to: 
600 (101.3 - 14.6) kt = $52m 
The transfer from consumers to cheese importers amounted to: 
600 (14.6 kt) = $8.8m 
This transfer is relatively small because volumes allowed to be imported have 
been small relative to consumption. 
The additional cost to consumers of exporting cheese (55.1 kt annual aver-
age for the period 1980-81 to 1981-82) amounted to: 
231 (55.1 kt) = $12.7m 
This sum represents the amount Australian cheese consumers are paying to 
"subsidize" cheese exports. It is estimated by calculating the amount by 
which marginal costs exceed those that would exist if production were reduced 
to eliminate all exports ($231/t), and multiplying it by export volumes. 12 
In other words, the resource misallocation cost of producing cheese which is 
eventually exported is $12.7m annually. 
In addition to the transfers already calculated, it is also possible to 
estimate the net welfare loss to the consumer arising from restricting con-
sumption to a level where the value to the consumer exceeds the marginal cost 
of cheese. It is approximately equal to: 
(0.5) n (Pd - Pc) 2 Q/Pd 
where Q is total consumption, at the wholesale price Pd. 
The net welfare loss is calculated as: 
(0.5) 0.5 (600) 2 101.3 k/1,907 = $4.8m 
Market Milk 
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Volume and gross value of production data for 1981-82 (BAE 1983b) is used 
to calculate annual consumer transfer and welfare costs related to market milk. 
The consumer transfer to market milk producers is estimated to be the 
difference between the average unit values of market milk and manufacturing 
milk (the market milk premium) multiplied by the volume of market milk, which is: 
(28.05 - 15.63¢/L) 1,526 ML = $189.53 M 
This estimate is based on the fact that some milk could be supplied to con-
sumers at the manufacturing milk price - 3,673 ML were supplied at that price 
during 1981-82. One common justification for the premium is that milk production 
is seasonal, requiring additional production costs to maintain milk supplies 
during the "off season." It was discovered, however, that despite higher costs, 
the premiums paid during 1977-78 resulted in net returns per unit of milk which 
were about 20 per cent higher for market milk than that for manufacturing milk 
(BAE 1981). Therefore, it is likely that a significant portion of the current 
market milk consumer transfer can be considered gross profits to producers. 
This is not entirely surprising since the market milk quote scheme in most states 
requires a producer to deliver milk consistently for at least a year before 
being granted a quota. This implies that the producer must be able to at least 
breakeven at the manufacturing milk price (unless he is gambling that he will 
receive a quota at the end of an unprofitable year). 
One important implication of the above analysis is that state DIAs, in 
their effort to ensure a steady supply of market milk, may be setting market 
milk price premiums at a level which is high enough to cover all exceptional 
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seasonal production costs incurred at the most costly time of year rather than 
at an average level for the entire year. 
The net welfare loss to market milk consumers can be estimated using the 
same method as that used for cheese in the previous section. It is approximately 
equal to: 
(0.5) 0.15 (12.4¢/L) 2 1,526 ML/28.05¢ = $6.27 M. 
The market milk price elasticity of demand used above, -0.15, was chosen from a 
range of Australian estimates (Tedesco and Collins). 
Potential Gains from Interstate Tradeability of Quota 
The current administered allocation of market milk quota (or its equivalent) 
has given rise to a disparity between states in marginal costs of production 
and a consequent waste of resources used in the production of the total 
Australian milk output. Efficient producers in Victoria and Tasmania cannot, 
given the level of MMQ, produce more milk profitably. In those states the 
average return covers competitive marginal costs and little more. In states 
where MMQ is not a binding constraint, average returns are allowed to exceed 
competitive marginal costs, and additional profits are earned. 
The implication of this disparity in marginal costs is that those states 
in which quota is scarce could produce some of the milk produced in the other 
states at less cost. With interstate tradeability of quota, efficient states 
would be prepared to buy some of the market milk quota from the states which 
hold relatively more quota. Eventually a free market in quota would result 
in a transfer of quota (in quantity X) such that efficient states (group A) 
would expand output to Q'A and less efficient states (group B) would contract 
their output to Q'B where their marginal costs were equal at C' (adjusted for 
transport costs). 
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The net saving in resources used to produce milk is the difference between 
the value of resources released in less efficient states and the value of the 
extra resources used to expand production in efficient states. 
Using n=l as the elasticity of the aggregate marginal cost schedule 
(Pandey, et al.), and assuming this elasticity also applies to regional com-
ponents of total supply and is constant over the relevant range, 13 it is 
possible to calculate the net welfare gain in relocating production. (The 
difference between marginal cost in the quota-scarce states and the average price 
is about 3.7¢/L.) 
Resources released in less efficient states are approximately: 
xC' + 0.5 (3.7-y) 
where y is the difference between current marginal costs in efficient states 
(CA) and costs with trade. (Therefore, y = C' - CA.) 
Resources brought into use in efficient states are valued roughly at: 
xC' - 0.5 xy. 
The net saving in resources is the difference between these, namely: 
1. 85x • 
It is now possible to calculate the quantity reallocation (x) between the 
two groups of states for 1981-82 from the elasticity of the cost schedules, 
given that actual total output QA + QB equalled 5,199 ML and the constrained 
states produced about 65 per cent of the total. 
where 
Quantities and cost changes are related by the formula: 
l>Q = nQ l>C/C 
n 1 for both groups 
CA 15.6¢/L 
CB 19.3¢/L 
QA 65 per cent of 5,199 ML 
QB 35 per cent of 5,199 ML. 
The change ~Q is equal to x for both groups. Therefore: 
x 0.65 (5,199)y/15.6 
and 
x = 0.35 (5,199) (3.7-y)/19.3 
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Solving for x, it is found that an efficient industry would relocate 243 ML 
of production from less efficient states to more efficient states. Substituting 
x = 243 ML in the estimate for the difference in resource costs indicates that 
this relocation of production would reduce resource costs by roughly $4.5m 
annually. 
Losses Due to Exports 
Despite declining volumes in recent years, the wholemilk equivalent of 
total Australian dairy exports was still 1,094 ML in 1981-82. As noted earlier, 
the average value of all milk produced during 1981-82 was 19.3¢/L, or 3.7¢/L 
above marginal costs of efficient producers. Therefore, 3.7¢/L (1,094 ML) = 
$40.5m is the current annual value of the deadweight loss to the Australian 
economy of "subsidizing" exports of milk products. This is a deadweight loss 
rather than a transfer to foreign consumers since the volume of Australian 
exports would presumably not affect world prices. Foreign consumers would have 
been able to purchase dairy products at those prices in any case. 
Deadweight losses are one of two types of distortions in the allocation 
of resources caused by the equalization scheme which pays dairy farmers a price 
equalling the average value of all manufacturing milk produced during a year. 
A financial loss occurs on all milk which is sold for less than the cost 
of producing it. Such losses occur on some export sales because producers 
extend production to the point where marginal costs equal average (equalized) 
revenues, rather than marginal revenues. 
A deadweight loss occurs on all milk which is sold for less than the 
expected value of that milk (valued at the time of production). Such losses 
18 
occur on all export sales because the expected (equalized) value of all 
exports exceeds the marginal value of those goods. Deadweight losses are not 
incurred by the dairy industry - farmers receive the expected value for their 
milk. Instead, the losses are incurred by the Australian economy because 
resources were allocated to dairying which could have made a larger contribution 
to national product had they been allocated to some other industry. 
Sunnnary of Annual Costs and Transfers 
An estimate of total costs and transfers resulting from dairy pricing 
policies for 1981-82 is presented in Table 1 as $354m. This figure includes 
all the estimates described earlier in this study plus estimates for the three 
remaining prescribed products - butter, WMP and casein - which were calculated 
in the same manner as those of SMP, and cheese. 
The largest components of the $354m total are consumer transfers. Each 
year domestic consumers pay domestic producers nearly $97m more for dairy pro-
ducts and about $190m more for market milk than would be required under competi-
tive market conditions. To put these costs and transfers into perspective, 
note that the total of $354m represented 35.3 per cent of the farm level gross 
value of milk production (GVP) during 1981-82. The total of $153.67m for 
manufacturing milk was 26.8 per cent of the GVP for that sector, while market 
milk's total of $200.3m represented 46.8 per cent of the farm level GVP of 
that portion of the dairy industry (BAE 1983b). 
Assessment of Policy Effects 
Critics of the dairy program are concerned about the extent to which the 
program has favored producers and processors at the expense of consumers. The 
analysis undertaken in this paper thus far appears to justify this concern. 
This section, then, attempts to assess more precisely whether or not milk 
producers and processors have been favored by dairy pricing policies. 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ANNUAL COSTS AND TRANSFERS: 1981-82 
Interstate 
Consumer Welfare Transfer to Loss from resource 
Product transfer loss imEorters exEorting misallocation 
$Am $Am $Am $Am $Am 
SMP 2.6 .02 0 (a) (b) 
Cheese 52.0 4.8 8 . 8 (a) (b) 
Butter 34.6 2.4 0 (a) (b) 
WMP 6.6 .27 0 (a) (b) 
Casein 1.03 .04 0 (a) (b) 
Manufacturing 
milk total 96.83 7.54 8 . 8 40.5 (b) 
Market milk 189.53 6.27 0 0 4.5 
Total 286.36 13.81 8 . 8 40.5 4.5 
Total of annual costs and transfers $353.97m 
(a) The amount for each product is included in the final total - only the 
loss of cheese exports was calculated separately, as outlined in the tex t. 
(b) This cost was calculated using volumes of milk, therefore it does not 
apply to any particular processed product. As outlined in the text, it re-
flects costs arising from market milk policies. 
NOTE: Several of these estimates were calculated from averaged data, as ex-
plained in the text. 
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Procedures used by Song and Song and Hallberg are used here to specify 
the nature of any bias in Australian dairy pricing policies. Estimates for 
each of 21 years are made, subject to the condition that the actual amount of 
milk that was available for processing in each year must be produced, for (1) 
a set of prices for market and manufacturing milk that would have maximized 
consumers' welfare from consumption of these types of milk, and (2) a set of 
prices for market and manufacturing milk that would have maximized milk 
processors' aggregate gross income. Actual farm-gate returns are compared with 
the optimal prices generated from these two solutions to assess the extent to 
which pricing policies were biased toward either producers or consumers in 
each of the 21 years from 1962-63 to 1982-83. 
For the sake of comparison, two "optimal" solutions are generated. To 
determine which price-quantity combinations will maximize dairy producer revenues, 
it is necessary to specify a demand function. The analysis used here follows 
that of Song and Hallberg. If there are n products made from milk, the annual 
farm level demand function can be written: 
where i, j = 1, 2, ... , n; Qi represents consumer demand for milk used in the 
ith product; and Pj represents the price of milk used in the jth product. A 
maximum aggregate processor gross income can be found by solving the quadratic 
programming problem: 
(2) maximize R 
subject to 
(3) a 1. + I: . b · . P . J 1] J Qi for all i, 
(4) I:iQi TQ, 
(5) Pi, Qi > 0 for all i. 
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Maximum consumer welfare is defined here as the maximum utility accruing 
to consumers from consumption of all milk. Therefore, using the demand 
functions defined by equation set (1), the price-quantity combinations that 
will maximize consumer welfare can be found by solving the problem: 
(6) Maximize U = Li !Q~ (Ai + Lj BijQj)dQi, 
subject to 
(7) Ai + L·B .. Q. J ~ J Pi for all i, 
(8) Li Qi = TQ, 
(9) Pi, Q· > 1- o. 
It is easily shown that marginal utilities in all markets must be equal. It is 
also assumed that the nature of demand is identical for the two markets con-
sidered. 
For this study, both market milk and manufacturing milk were considered. 
The two sectors were assumed to constitute separate markets, but the demand for 
each product was assumed to be a function of its own price as well as the price 
of the other product. 
Own-price and cross-price elasticities shown below were taken or derived 
from the demand studies cited earlier and from George and King. These are used 
with a quadratic programming algorithm much like that of Ladd and Updegraff 
to obtain solutions for each year. 
Market Milk Manufacturing Milk 
Market milk -0.25 0.01 
Manufacturing milk 0.02 -0.45 
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that producers' gross 
income could have been increased in each year by a reallocation of milk actually 
used among the two products under a more discriminatory pricing scheme. This 
increase would have been possible had more milk been marketed in the form of 
TABLE 2: ACTUAL AND "OPTIMAL" MILK PRICE.S (SELECTED YEARS) 
Year Market milk Manufacturing milk Weighted average 
$/kg butterfat $/kg butterfat $/kg butterfat 
ACTUAL PRICES 
1962-63 2.31 0.96 1.23 
1967-68 2.40 0.95 1.27 
1972-73 2.74 1.23 1.57 
1977-78 4.61 1.53 2.36 
1982-83 7.92 3.62 4.78 
"OPTIMAL" PRODUCER PRICES 
1962-63 3.78 0.90 1.39 
1967-68 3.93 0.88 1.35 
1972-73 4.49 1.14 1. 78 
1977-78 7.54 1.37 2.78 
1982-83 12.96 3 . 25 5.24 
"OPTIMAL" CONSUMER PRICES 
1962-63 1.09 1.09 1.09 
1967-68 1.06 1.06 1.06 
1972-73 1.32 1.32 1.32 
1977- 78 1. 73 1. 73 1. 73 
1982-83 3.88 3.88 3.88 
NOTE: The actual and "optimal" prices were recorded or calculated for all 
21 years. 
TABLE 3: MILK PRODUCER GROSS REVENUE UNDER "OPTIMAL" CONDITIONS 
(SELECTED YEARS) 
Under producer Under consumer 
revenue maximization welfare maximization 
Deviation Deviation 
Year Estimate from actual Estimate from actual 
$Am % $Am % 
1962-63 396 +13.0 310 -11.4 
1967-68 391 + 6.3 307 -16.5 
1972-73 526 +13.4 390 -15.9 
1977-78 646 +17 .8 402 -26.7 
1982-83 1,219 +13.4 873 -18.8 
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manufacturing milk at lower prices and less market milk sold at higher prices 
(to the extent possible considering the nature of the pricing arrangements). 
On the other hand, had milk been priced to maximize consumer welfare, 
gross producer income would have been lower. Consumers would have preferred 
a decrease in price and increase in quantity of market milk marketed, and an 
increase in price and decrease in quantity of manufacturing milk in each year. 
It is important to note that the actual weighted average price has been 
closer to that price which would have maximized producer revenues, rather 
than that which would have maximized consumer welfare. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Australian milk prices are not set to 
maximize consumer welfare or producer revenue. Hence, producer and processor 
revenue is currently higher than if products were priced more in line with 
consumer interests, but not as high as it would be if producers were able to 
charge the optimal monopoly price. As expected, dairy pricing policies have 
resulted in price levels falling between those of the extremes of monopoly 
pricing and perfectly competitive pricing systems. So, although the dairy 
industry has been receiving some monopoly profits, the amounts are less than 
those which an unregulated monopoly would have received. 
The implication of the above results is that the influence of consumers 
is felt through their impact on markets. In the price-setting process, the 
nature of consumer demand affects information pertaining to the ten criteria 
considered by the ADC. The net result is that consumer demand acts as a 
limiting factor on production decisions - just as the theory of market equili-
brium states. 
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Sunnnary and Conclusions 
Australia recently became the first major 
to eliminate federal intervention in the price 
----
dairy product exporter to decide 1 
discovery process. Therefore, J 
Australian dairy policies are presented as a case study. Of concern here is 
whether existing forms of government intervention improve the performance of ] / 
Australian dairy product markets compared to the competitive market which 
would operate in the absence of intervention. 
Both federal and state organizations play active roles in the Australian 
dairy price-setting process. The instruments of dairy pricing policy are 
mechanisms for controlling output produced at the artifically elevated domestic 
~ 1} \l. 
price. The policies result in producers receiving misleadin price information 
and, consequently, producing more than would be generated in a competitive 
market. 
As a result of federal and state policies, both milk producers and 
manufacturers receive a higher price than they would receive in a competitive 
market. Federal policies create price discrimination on domestic markets 
and subsidize exports. State policies distort the spatial allocation of 
productive resources by requiring that dairying must exist within each state 
whether or not it is efficient. 
Annual costs and transfers resulting from existing dairy pricing policies 
are estimated to have totalled about $354 million in 1981-82. 
Dairy pricing policies have favored dairy producers and processors at 
the expense of consumers, but the additional revenues received by processors 
amount to less than those which would have been received in an unregulated / 
monopoly. 
The economic impact of government intervention in the Australian dairy 
industry is significant. As a consequence of policies allowing domestic prices 
to move above international price trends, domestic consumers are providing 
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increasingly higher levels of assistance to the dairy industry. If this trend 
is maintained, it will continue to encourage consumers to find substitutes for 
dairy products. Additional consequences would be increased pressure on 
relaxation of import restrictions and the use of resources to produce dairy 
products sold on export markets at a deadweight loss to the Australian economy. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The AEP is the estimated average return from all export sales of a 
product manufactured in a particular period. The desired wholesale price 
is calculated by the ADC using ten criteria, but it is most often charac-
terized as "what the market will bear" (Blank). 
2. Market milk as a percentage of total milk production for 1981-82, by 
state, was: Victoria -- 13.7, Tasmania -- 13.7, South Australia -- 44.1, 
Queensland -- 47.4, Western Australia -- 55.5, New South Wales -- 64.4. 
3. This was calculated by finding the average price per liter per year that 
a bid of $50/L (per week) represented, $50 = 96.2¢/L, then dividing that 
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amount by the Queensland differential between market and manufacturing 
milk prices (31.9 - 15.6 = 16.3¢/L) to get an average payback of 
96
•
2 
= 5.9 years. 
16.3 
4. The values used here for market and manufacturing milk are average unit 
values calculated using the gross value of production and total produc-
tion figures from BAE (1983b). 
5. Theoretically, this means that transfers from the consumer accrue wholly 
to producers and are not shared with processors. Of course, this is not 
really the case - processors do benefit from consumer transfers, despite 
the degree of competition and government intervention. 
6. This possibly biases marginal costs downwards, though the bias is small 
since the relatively efficient states (constrained by quota) dominate the 
industry, producing about 65 per cent of Australian output, and further 
rationalization could possibly generate further economies of scale. 
7. This is derived from the elasticities of demand for the joint products 
SMP and butter, and for cheese because those products represent a 
majority of total demand. Using both (inelastic) domestic and (perfectly 
elastic) export elasticities in the calculations gives an estimate of 
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-1.02 for the joint products and -.58 for cheese. A weighted sum for the 
two markets gives an estimate of -.82 for the elasticity of total demand. 
8. This differential is estimated by subtracting the average price of 
manufacturing milk (15.6¢/L in 1981-82) from the average value of all 
milk (19.3¢/L in 1981-82). The average value of milk is simply gross value 
of product divided by total milk production (both figures are quoted in 
BAE 1983b). 
9. This estimated increase in quantities demanded and produced assumes that 
aggregate demand (domestic and export) increases and that the ADC wishes 
to maintain export markets. If maintaining export market contacts is not 
of concern, it is possible that additional quantities demanded by domestic 
consumers will be provided by reducing exports and, therefore, production 
and production costs will not increase. 
10. The model assumes that a change in domestic supply has the same absolute 
effect on the price of all cheese including imported cheese. It could be 
argued that the same proportional price change is more likely because an 
increase in prices of cheaper domestic cheeses causes a substitution of 
demand towards more expensive imported varieties, bidding the price of 
imports up further. If this is the case, this analysis underestimates 
the transfer from consumers to importing agents. 
11. The only bias which might be expected is due to using the demand 
elasticity as the measure of responsiveness to wholesale price changes 
rather than retail prices changes. The assumption that the processing 
and retail sectors are competitive is maintained so that changes in the 
price of manufacturing milk result in the same absolute price changes 
at both the wholesale and the retail levels. 
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12. This change in production costs is estimated using the same method as 
that used in the competitive outcome section. The total of $231/t re-
presents the increase in costs incurred when cheese producers increase 
production with the expectation of increased revenues from equalization. 
13. The assumption of identical supply elasticities for both groups of states 
is used because regional estimates are not available. Since it is expected 
that those elasticities do vary between regions, the estimates given here 
understate the actual effects somewhat. 
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